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182 abstract
The risk assessment system was introduced in the Republic of Croatia in 2009, as 
a result of harmonization with international standards, especially the Directive 
2005/60/EC on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of 
money laundering and terrorist financing. Risk assessment is an extensive concept 
which requires not only a legislative framework, but also the application of nume-
rous criteria for its effective implementation in practice. Among these criteria are 
suspicious transactions, closely related to the assessment of the customer, tran-
saction, product or service.
The undeniable contribution of suspicious transactions to the quality of the risk 
assessment system will be confirmed by a statistical analysis of a number of West 
and East European countries. A combination of strict, but sufficiently flexible le-
gal provisions governing the system for prevention of money laundering and ter-
rorist financing and a statistical analysis of reported suspicious transactions will 
lead to conclusions that either support or represent criticism of the efficiency of 
application of the risk assessment system in practice.
The aforementioned statistical analysis will show whether suspicious transactions 
are a reliable criterion for the risk assessment analysis, and whether they can be 
considered the only such criterion. There is a possibility that the findings of the 
analysis will be contradictory to those of some international studies.
Keywords: money laundering, suspicion, transaction, risk, risk assessment, stati-
stics, analysis
1 introduction
The variety of possibilities to convert illegal into apparently legal money suggests 
that money laundering is a complex activity. Without prejudice to the unbounded 
sophistication, inventiveness and imagination of money launderers in finding per-
fect way to launder money, preventive measures to this effect include the detec-
tion of cash and suspicious transactions through risk assessment, i.e. the applica-
tion of a risk-based system1.
This raises the issues of implementation of the idea of money laundering preven-
tion through risk assessment, the legality of its practical consequences and logica-
lity of its realisation. Resolving these issues requires understanding of the defini-
tion and nature of risk assessment. In this context, suspicious transactions repre-
sent the backbone of any money laundering prevention system, the analysis of 
which will show how the risk assessment operates in practice.
1 The “risk-based system” is a money laundering prevention system based on risk assessment, as opposed to 
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1832 meaning of the “risk-based approach” system 
The primary characteristic of the money laundering prevention system based on 
risk assessment is that it is complex and necessarily resilient. While on the one 
hand the financial and non-financial sectors are required to apply some basic pre-
vention rules, on the other hand they are supposed to have their own approaches 
to risk assessment, and hence to the reporting of suspicious transactions.
The main principle underlying any system for the prevention of money laundering 
and terrorist financing is that the higher the risk of money laundering the closer the 
attention needed from all competent institutions. Yet, following this principle is 
far from simple. Unlike with the rule-based system2 applied so far, the logic 
behind the risk-based system is entirely different.
A system based on rules initially requires from all those responsible for the pre-
vention to apply clear and rigid rules in legally prescribed situations. Within such 
a system, financial and non-financial institutions, being the chief agents of preve-
ntion, are focused on meeting the precisely defined legal conditions (treating them 
equally) rather than on “taking the pulse” of potential money launderers. 
A much greater effort is required to change the perception of the importance and 
scope of money laundering prevention, from the routine fact-finding prescribed by 
law to the assessment of each client through a sophisticated risk assessment filter. 
Unavoidable in this context is the appropriate application of the legislation as well 
as guidelines and indicators to be adjusted to each particular case and then used in 
practice.
Accordingly, the risk assessment system requires not only the assessment, but also 
classification of risks and their materialisation in the form of suspicious transac-
tions. While suspicious transactions constitute the backbone of the risk, it is clear 
that there are no universally accepted methodologies to describe the nature and 
scope of such transactions. They appear through the identification and classifica-
tion of the money laundering and terrorist financing risks, which results in the 
establishment of control mechanisms tailored to the detected risk.
This statement does not mean the absence of any principled rules applying to the 
customer and the customer’s business. The imposed rules only represent a fra-
mework for action, with a certain degree of flexibility of implementation, in ac-
cordance with the risk assessment for each category of customers, transactions, 
products or services rendered.
2 The “rule based system”, i.e. a system based on rules was presented in the first two EU directives on 
prevention of the use of the financial system for money laundering purposes (Directive 91/308/EEC and 
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184 2.1 risk categorisation
The FATF Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach to Combating Money Launde-
ring and Terrorist Financing indicates three steps in an effective implementation 
of the risk-based approach, namely the risk detection, risk assessment and deve-
lopment of strategies to manage and mitigate the risks (Financial Action Task 
Force, 2007). The risk, as the basic concept, is closely related to the customer, 
product of service, including the manner of conducting transactions and geo-
graphic location of the country assessing the risk. 
The said FATF Guidance recognises three risk categories: low risk, high risk and 
innovation (new technologies to ensure anonymity). The fourth category compri-
ses mechanisms for the analysis of applied procedures for deciding on the level of 
risk, the way of acting upon identified risks and the evaluation of such actions. 
Risk assessment should be tailored to each customer, product or service, by em-
ploying a measure corresponding to the degree of identified risk. However, it is 
not unthinkable that two financial institutions could take different decisions on the 
basis of similar parameters.
This reaffirms the fact that the risk assessment method is not easy to apply. The 
sharper the deviation from the risk assessment principle the stronger is the possi-
bility of negative consequences. While the overestimation of risk is impossible 
due to limited time, personnel and information sources, its underestimation is an 
unacceptable alternative. A good risk assessment system should primarily be ba-
lanced. To this effect, an efficient application of the risk-based approach should 
include the undertaking of customer due diligence, as well as effective supervi-
sion and information exchange between the financial intelligence unit (hereinaf-
ter: FIU) and all institutions participating in the prevention of money laundering 
and terrorist financing.
3 suspicious transactions
The money laundering risk assessment by its nature consists in the filtering of all 
available information in order to identify suspicious transactions or customers. 
Given the complexity of the money laundering process, it is clear that the detec-
tion of suspicious transactions involves a set of different preventive measures.
If the money laundering stages are viewed from the perspective of implementation 
of the money laundering risk assessment, the placement and layering stages are 
the most relevant in the process of transforming money into a more convenient 
form of assets (Cindori, 2010). Despite the differences in the money laundering 
modalities with respect to the amount of money to be laundered, relevant legisla-
tion, economic situation, financial market, chosen method of operation (through 
the financial or non-financial sector), as well as the actual (stages of the) process 
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185assessed during these two stages, because they offer unlimited opportunities to 
carry out due diligence of the customer, a product or a transaction.
At the first stage, by placing money into the financial system or converting it into 
another form of assets, money launderers are already subject to customer due di-
ligence, i.e. the application of the risk-based system. At the second stage, cash is 
deposited in one or several accounts (held by one or more persons) with a view to 
fragmenting large amounts of money and channelling them to various natural or 
legal persons and changing the form of money. The activities subsequently carried 
out by legislators for prevention purposes, i.e. the detection of suspicious or illo-
gical transactions, most frequently constitute modus operandi at the layering sta-
ge. From this perspective, it is easy to conclude that suspicious transactions are 
very difficult to detect at the third money laundering stage (integration stage).
3.1 suspicious transactions in the european union
The EU directives on prevention of the use of the financial system for money 
laundering purposes very clearly show the evolution of the definition of suspi-
cious transaction. By setting up the fundamentals of a prevention strategy to com-
bat money laundering, these directives impose the need for harmonization and 
adjustment of national legislations. In this context, the need is emphasized to set 
up an anti-money laundering system relying on “a risk-based approach”, which 
will increases the importance of suspicious transactions and their treatment.
The first attempts to set up a framework for preventive measures in the area of 
anti-money laundering were made in the Directive 91/308/EEC (hereinafter: First 
Directive), which was the first to define, although very elastically, the term “suspi-
cious transaction”. As this definition required from credit and financial institutions 
to check each transaction that might be connected with money laundering, the 
content of the term was obviously vague and it should necessarily undergo legi-
slative revision at the national level. Taking into account that the First Directive 
was only guidance for action at the national level, despite the very elastic defini-
tion of suspicious transactions it provided (Graham, Bell and Elliott, 2006), it in a 
way created a basis for preventive action. 
The Directive 2001/97/EC (hereinafter: Second Directive) does not go much fur-
ther in developing the definition of suspicious transactions, but it identifies inde-
pendent professions and occupations that are exempt from the obligation to report 
suspicious transactions in certain cases3. 
In contrast to the first two directives, the Directive 2005/60/EC on the prevention 
of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing (hereinafter: Third Directive) is based on risk assessment and hence it 
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186 deals with the issue of detecting suspicious transaction in an entirely different 
way. 
The Third Directive assigns a new role to suspicious transactions, seeing them 
(indirectly) as the backbone of money laundering prevention through a risk-based 
system. In the Directive, the term “suspicious transaction” is not explained in the 
form of a definition, but is “hidden” in Article 20 (Reporting Obligations). While 
it, to some extent, repeats the definition from the First Directive, this Article ex-
pands the concept of suspicious transactions to include complex and unusual tran-
sactions, specifying and elaborating on the concept of “being suspicious”4. All this 
said, there is no doubt that suspicious transactions are important for setting up a 
money laundering prevention system, as reflected in the obligation of all institu-
tions and persons covered by the Third Directive to carry out customer due dili-
gence, which is a signal of a new, risk-based approach to suspicious transactions.
The implementation of customer due diligence measures and their content clearly 
suggest that the perception of money laundering goes far beyond the disposing of 
cash, and the suspicion of money laundering exists from the customer identifica-
tion at the moment of (or before) establishing a business relationship to the verifi-
cation of data. Suspicion also exists when carrying out other due diligence activi-
ties which require an ongoing gathering of information on the purpose and envi-
saged nature of the business relationship and its continuous monitoring, with a 
view to creating the customer, business and risk profiles and identifying the source 
of the customer’s funds. 
Similar development logic of suspicious transactions can be found in the FATF 
Recommendations. Significant changes towards risk assessment can be observed 
in the latest revised FATF Recommendations 2012. Both financial and non-fina-
ncial sectors are increasingly focused on higher-risk areas, while the measures 
applicable to lower-risk areas become simpler and more elastic.5
4 risk assessment system in the republic of croatia
The legislation of the Republic of Croatia has been developed in accordance with 
the three aforementioned directives.
The first anti-money laundering law was passed in 1997. The definition of suspi-
cious transactions was not given separately, but it arose from the content of custo-
mer identification procedures6, which did not specify the characteristics of a suspi-
cious transaction, but a suspicious transaction was considered to be “any cash or 
non-cash transaction for which there is suspicion of money laundering”.
4 For more information, see Article 22 of the Third Directive.
5 The Revised Recommendations are available at: [http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/docu-
ments/internationalstandardsoncombatingmoneylaunderingandthefinancingofterrorismproliferation-thefatfre-
commendations.html].
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187By introducing amendments to the Anti-Money Laundering Act7 (hereinafter: 
AMLA) considerable progress was made in this respect, but without any substan-
tial changes in the operation of the Anti-Money Laundering Office (hereinafter: 
Office). There was still no definition of suspicious transactions, although the term 
was used in the general provisions on the activities of the Office in “detecting 
suspicious transactions, concealing the true source of money, property or a right 
suspected to have been obtained illegally in the country or abroad”8. While this 
undoubtedly emphasized the importance of suspicious transactions, it was quite 
certain that the Office’s activities were still focused on cash transactions9.
By following the Third Directive, the Republic of Croatia introduced a new Anti-
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act10 (hereinafter: AMLTFA), thereby 
adopting the risk assessment system. In other words, the necessity to carry out 
customer due diligence and risk assessment as crucial measures has been mentio-
ned throughout the AMLTFA. Consequently, suspicious transactions play a lea-
ding role in the detection of money laundering and terrorist financing. This is re-
flected in the obligation of the Office to carry out analytical data processing 
exactly on the basis of substantiated reasons for suspicion of money laundering or 
terrorist financing.
Besides suspicious transactions, the AMLTFA also recognizes complex and unu-
sual transactions. In contrast to suspicious transactions that arouse a certain de-
gree of suspicion sufficient for establishing a criminal offence, an unusual transa-
ction is considered to be any illogical transaction in relation to which no criminal 
offence has yet been established. Given these criteria, it is beyond doubt that a 
large number of reported suspicious transactions actually constitute unusual or 
illogical transactions (Savona, 2004). 
This is exactly why the legislator emphasized the need to pay close attention to all 
complex and unusual transaction, as well as to any other unusual form of transac-
tion having no obvious economic or legal purpose11. The risk assessment system 
definitely requires that such transactions be monitored, even in situations when no 
reasons for suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing have yet been 
identified.
7 Amendments to the Anti-Money Laundering Act (Croatian version, OG 117/03).
8 The amendments to the existing Act were in accordance with the international standards then in force, i.e. 
Article 3, paragraph (8) of the Second Directive, and FATF Recommendations Nos 13 and 11.
9 For more information, see the Ministry of Finance Annual Reports 2005-2008: [http://www.mfin.hr/hr/
godisnjaci-ministarstva] and Moneyval reports: [http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Evaluations/
Evaluation _reports_en.asp].
10 Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act (Croatian version, OG 87/08).
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188 4.1 definition and assessment of risk 
The guiding principle of the AMLTFA arises from the risk assessment, as shown 
in Article 7 of the Act, providing a definition of the money laundering and terrorist 
financing risks. The focus is principally on the risk that a customer might misuse 
the financial system for money laundering or terrorist financing, or that a business 
relationship, a transaction or a product might be directly or indirectly used for 
money laundering or terrorist financing purposes.
In order to reduce the risk, reporting entities are obliged to undertake a risk 
analysis and use it for assessing the risk of a group or type of customers, a busi-
ness relationship, a product or a transaction with respect to their potential misuse 
for money laundering or terrorist financing purposes. In this context, reporting 
entities may include in the group of customers representing a negligible risk only 
the customers determined by a rulebook laid down by the finance minister. The 
limitation regarding risk assessment arises from the reporting entity’s obligation 
to comply with the guidelines issued by competent supervisory authorities. In 
other words, during the risk analysis and assessment both the reporting entity and 
supervisory authority are obliged to consider the specific characteristics of the 
reporting entity and its business, while taking into account the size and organisa-
tional structure of the reporting entity, the type of customers it deals with and the 
type of products it offers.
4.2 definition of suspicious transactions
The risk assessment procedure inevitably entails the definition of the concept of 
“suspicious transactions”. Treating risk assessment as the guiding principle, the 
AMLTF treats suspicious transactions with equal care, surpassing the criteria set 
in accordance with international standards.
In light of this, according to the Act, a suspicious transaction is any attempted or 
executed cash or non-cash transaction, regardless of its value and the manner of 
its execution. Already in the first part of the definition the legislator emphasizes 
the active role of a reporting entity in the detection of (innovative) money launde-
ring or terrorist financing attempts. The definition further indicates three characte-
ristics a transaction may (but not necessarily must) have in order to be considered 
as suspicious:
a)  it must be connected with illegal sources or funds or with terrorist financing;
b)  it must deviate from a customer’s normal operation, taking into account the 
set indicators; and
c)  there must be an attempt to find loopholes in the law.
Besides these possible reasons for suspicion of money laundering, established on 
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189stomer for which/whom the reporting entity deems that there are reasons for su-
spicion of money laundering or terrorist financing12.
As suspicious transactions, by their very nature, pose high money laundering and 
terrorist financing risks, each reporting entity is obliged to detect them within its 
activity, taking into account the specificities of the business. This confirms that the 
AMNLTFA is founded on risk assessment, the monitoring of the customer’s ope-
rations and collection of information on the purpose and envisaged nature of the 
business relationship. This is why the compilation of a list of indicators for the 
detection of suspicious transactions and persons in relation to which there are re-
asons for suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing is within the com-
petence of the reporting entity13. 
4.3 treatment of suspicious transactions
Besides the aforementioned definition of a suspicious transaction, the AMLTFA, 
in its very introduction, defines a suspicious transaction as any transaction for 
which a reporting entity and/or a competent authority deems that there are reasons 
for suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing in relation to that transac-
tion or a person conducting the transaction, or a transaction suspected to involve 
funds derived from illegal activities. While it is emphasized that a competent au-
thority can also assess a transaction a suspicious, based on a subsequently con-
ducted strategic analysis, the focus is also on the importance of such transactions 
for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing.
In order to be classified as suspicious, transactions must be previously passed 
through the risk assessment filter, i.e. subjected to customer due diligence measu-
res. The customer due diligence measures comprise identifying the customer and 
the beneficial owner and verifying their identities, as well as collecting informa-
tion on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship or a transac-
tion. Besides these due diligence measures, it is particularly important to conduct 
ongoing monitoring of the business relationship to ensure the implementation of 
the risk assessment system in the way that the transaction analysis is consistent 
with the reporting entity’s knowledge about the customer, type of business and 
risk, including, where applicable, information on the sources of funds14.
The same reasoning applies to the supervision of reporting entities. The Financial 
Inspectorate supervises compliance with the AMLTFA of all reporting entities 
exclusively on the basis of the assessment of money laundering and terrorist finan-
cing risks. In this context, should the Inspectorate establish that a legal person, a 
12 A definition of suspicious transactions is given in Article 42 of the AMLTFA.
13 For a full and comprehensive overview, the supervisory authorities cooperate with reporting entities in the 
compilation of the list of indicators. Similarly, the minister of finance may, in a special rulebook, prescribe 
mandatory inclusion of particular indicators in the list of indicators for the detection of suspicious transactions 
and persons in respect of which there are reasons for suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing. For 
more information, see Article 41, paragraphs (5) and (6) of the AMLTFA.
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190 member of the management board (or another responsible person of the legal 
person), or a natural person has failed to make a risk analysis, or risk assessment 
for a particular group or type of customers, business relationships, products or 
transactions, or if such persons have failed to align the risk analysis and asse-
ssment with the guidelines issued by a competent supervisory authority, it can 
impose a fine on such persons for the committed violations15.
4.4 acting upon suspicious transactions
The treatment of suspicious transactions is also reflected in the manner of repor-
ting suspicious transactions and of how the Office acts upon them. Should a repor-
ting entity, after the risk analysis, know or suspect that a transaction is connected 
with money laundering or terrorist financing, it should notify the Office of such a 
transaction without delay16 prior to the execution of the transaction. The notifica-
tion should be sent by telephone, fax or in another appropriate way, indicating all 
reasons for the suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing and the de-
adline for the execution of the transaction17. Particularly important is the submis-
sion of information on the intention and planning to carry out a suspicious transac-
tion, regardless of whether the transaction has subsequently been executed or 
not18.
By following the same line of logic, the commencement of the analytical proces-
sing by the Office is closely related to the transactions or persons in respect of 
which a reporting entity or a competent authority “submits substantiated reasons 
for suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing”19. Thus, the legislator 
has placed emphasis on the fact that the Office should acts upon transactions for 
which the risk analysis has been made, and has limited any action based on strict 
compliance with the rules. As a consequence of this, the number of “formally” 
15 A legal person will be fined between HRK 50,000 and HRK 700,000 and a member of the management board 
or another responsible person of the legal person will be fined between HRK 6,000 and HRK 30,000. A natural 
person who is a craftsman or a natural person engaged in another independent activity will be fined between 
HRK 35,000 and HRK 450,000 for the same violation. For more information, see Article 90 of the AMLTFA.
16 Exempt from the obligation to report suspicious transactions is a group of professions and occupations, such 
as lawyers, notaries public, auditors and natural and legal persons providing accounting and tax consulting 
services, with respect to the information obtained from customers or about customers during the determination 
of the legal status of a customer or its representation in the court proceedings (including counselling the 
customer to propose or avoid legal proceedings), regardless of whether the information was obtained or 
collected before, during or after the proceedings. For more information, see Article 55 of the AMLTFA.
17 We are talking here about an “active” role of the reporting entities based on their initiative, as oposed to a 
“passive” obligation to submit data additionally requested by the Office (Mitsilegas, 2003).
18 Should it be necessary to take urgent action to verify data on a suspicious transaction or person, or should 
the Office deem that there are reasons for suspicion that a transaction or a person is connected with money 
laundering or terrorist financing, the Office may issue a written order instructing the reporting entity to 
temporarily suspend the execution of the suspicious transaction for a maximum of 72 hours. The Office will 
notify the State Attorney’s Office and/or the competent State Attorney’s Branch Office without delay of the 
issued orders. For more information, see Article 60 of the AMLTFA. 
19 Exceptionally, the Office may commence the analytical processing of suspicious transactions at a 
substantiated written proposal of the competent authorities, but only if such activities might be connected 
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191open cases, encouraged under the old AMLA, was now reduced, which released 
additional resources for the Office20. 
4.5 complexity of the scope of “substantiated reasons for 
suspicion”
The way the Office acts upon “submission of substantiated reasons for suspicion 
of money laundering or terrorist financing” shows that the Office does not consi-
der only suspicious transactions, but also all other transactions, either cash or 
linked transactions, for which it receives substantiated reasons for suspicion of 
money laundering or terrorist financing from a reporting entity. 
The money laundering methods and typologies used by natural persons support 
the need for such an approach, but also for a more flexible, risk-based procedure. 
For example, depositing unusually large cash amounts, as a money laundering 
typology used by natural persons, includes cash deposits in all types of accounts 
which deviate from the normal customer’s account turnover. These are usually 
considerable amounts derived from illegal activities and representing illegal in-
come of the customer. Most transactions of this type are not consistent with the 
business and economic criteria.
The very name of this money laundering method suggests that it deals with cash 
deposits, i.e. cash transactions. However, as the content of the term “unusually” 
(large amounts) varies from customer to customer, and is determined, e.g. by a 
customer’s business background, the values of such suspicious or illogical tran-
sactions very often remain below the legally prescribed limit for “cash transac-
tions” subject to reporting to the Office. In assessing the risk of such transactions 
and identifying the character of their dubiousness, the first thing to do is to orga-
nise training for employees of financial and non-financial institutions who should 
be able, based on the indicators of suspicious transactions and information on the 
customer’s business, to detect a suspicious transaction and establish whether a 
business is really illegal.
As unusual or large cash deposits are conspicuous and open up further possibili-
ties of a quick detection of money laundering cases, the so-called “linked transac-
tions” are usually used in practice. They imply breaking down a large amount into 
several smaller amounts (to evade the reporting threshold for cash transactions), 
because smaller cash amounts apparently represent a better way of money launde-
ring.
The breaking down of a transaction into smaller amounts and creation of “linked 
transactions” in order to evade the reporting requirements is referred to in English 
20 The legislative changes led to a restructuring of the Office, i.e. the establishment, among other departments, 
of a Prevention and Customer Supervision Department and a Strategic Analysis and IT System Department. 



























































37 (2) 181-206 (2013)
192 literature as “structuring”. Richards uses the same term explaining it as follows: 
“a person structures a transaction if that person, acting alone, or in conjunction 
with, or on behalf of other persons, conducts, or intends to conduct, one or more 
transactions in currency, in any amount, at one or more financial institutions, on 
one or more days and in any manner, for the purpose of evading the reporting re-
quirements...” (Richards, 1998)21. Given this definition of the term “structuring”, 
it is beneficial to use the suspicious transaction indicators in order to facilitate the 
detection of linked transactions which are in themselves defined elastically, due to 
the complexity of their execution and impossibility of their strict regulation.
Consequently, it is obvious that, like cash and suspicious transactions, linked tran-
sactions can also be the subject of consideration for the Office, provided that there 
are “substantiated reasons for suspicion of money laundering or terrorist fina-
ncing” with respect to such transactions. They will be considered as suspicious 
transaction and recorded in the Office’s statistics. Concrete analyses of suspicious 
transactions will show why this is important and what we can learn about the risk-
based system from the statistics on reported suspicious transactions.
5 an analysis of suspicious transactions as risk assessment 
system analysis 
The application of a risk-based based system is far from being simple, from the 
perspectives of both legislative regulation and practical implementation effi-
ciency. The complexity of the system is due to suspicious transactions, the content 
of which is indeterminable while their scope must not be limited. It is exactly this 
legislative philosophy that the risk assessment system is based on.
In order to prove the efficiency of application of such a system in the Republic of 
Croatia, we compared the statistics on suspicious transactions reported in the pe-
riod 2005-2010 across ten countries of different sizes and at different levels of 
development and compliance with international standards.
5.1 impact of the risk-based approach on the number of 
reported suspicious transactions
According to the Final Study on the Application of the Third EU Directive on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering 
(hereinafter: Final Study)22, a risk-based system has a positive influence on repor-
ting on suspicious transactions, in terms of the number of reported suspicious or 
unusual transactions, quality of such reports and their effects on the detection of 
suspicious transactions.
21 There have been similar considerations in the Republic of Croatia long before the introduction of the legi-
slation prescribing anti-money laundering measures. Hršak wrote about linked transactions as far back as 
1993, as “large-scale financial operations broken down into a series of smaller transactions in small amou-
nts of money” (Heršak, 1993).
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193In the discussion on the “number of reported suspicious transactions” criterion 
and its relationship to the “quality of the reports” criterion in the said Final Study, 
it is emphasized that these two criteria are interdependent, i.e. that there is an in-
crease in both the number of reported suspicious transactions and the quality of 
the reports, as a consequence of the application of the risk-based approach (as 
opposed to the previously applied rule-based approach).
As the application of the risk-based approach in the Republic of Croatia shows a 
completely opposite trend, i.e. a fall in the number of reported transactions, this 
problem demands closer attention in order to establish the real correlation be-
tween the number of reported suspicious transactions and the achievement of the 
main goals of the risk assessment system.
table 1 
Reported suspicious transactions related to money laundering, 2005-2010
country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Bulgaria 680 374 431 591 883 1,460
France 11,553 12,047 12,481 14,565 17,310 19,208
Croatia 2,908 2,891 2,857 2,323 629 602
Liechtenstein 192 161 205 157* 235 261*
Germany 8,241 10,051 9,080 7,349 9,046 11,042
Romania 3,858 3,195 2,574 2,332 2,259 2,925
Slovenia 116 165 192 248 199 233
Serbia 138 622 1,432 2,884 3,957 4,537
Switzerland 729 619 795 851 896 1,159
Ukraine 350,507 313,074 322,966 290,418 227,192 96,221**
* Reports on suspicious transactions received by 1 October 2008/2010.
** Reports on suspicious transactions received by 1 August 2010.
Source: MONEYVAL23 Reports and Annual Reports of the stated countries.
5.1.1 a fall in the number of reported suspicious transactions
In order to understand the real nature of the risk assessment system and its corre-
lation with the number of reported suspicious transactions, an analysis will be 
made of a fall in the number of reported suspicious transactions, observed in the 
Republic of Croatia, Slovenia and Ukraine.
5.1.1.1 croatia
The data on suspicious transactions related to money laundering, reported to the 
Office in the period 2005-2008 clearly show that their number was constant. With 
the entry into force of the AMLTFA in 2009, under which the risk-based approach 
was used in the detection and reporting of suspicious transactions, the number of 
suspicious transaction reports decreased up to five times (in 2009 and 2010). A 
comparison between the four-year period of application of the AMLA (2005-
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194 2008) and the two years of application of the AMLTFA (2009-2010) clearly shows 
that half as many suspicious transactions (on average) were reported in the two-
year period of applying the risk-based approach as in one year of application of 
the rule-based approach.
The established decline in reported suspicious transactions was due to the applica-
tion of the AMLTFA, which provides a very detailed description of the nature of 
suspicious transactions. Besides in the AMLTFA, suspicious transactions are also 
dealt with in the Regulations on the Notification of the Anti-Money Laundering 
Office of Suspicious Transactions and Persons24, with a detailed specification of 
the manner of and deadlines for reporting, as well as additional information to be 
submitted to the Office, and the electronic data delivery.
As a result of a detailed prescription of the content of a suspicious transaction and 
of assigning an active role to reporting entities25 in setting up indicators for the 
detection of suspicious transactions, as well as their frequent participation in the 
training measures (in 2009 and 2010)26, the statistics only confirm an improve-
ment in the quality of reports on suspicious transactions to the detriment of their 
quantity. Reporting entities have thus shown their maturity in the assessment of 
risks and detection of suspicious, unusual or illogical transactions. This mainly 
applies to the financial sector, i.e. banks, because they accounted for 90% of total 
suspicious transactions reported in the period 2005-2008, while this share dropped 
to 50% in the period 2009-2010. Nevertheless, the number of suspicious transac-
tion reports coming from the non-banking and non-financial sectors remained un-
changed, leaving a plenty of room for improvement and the overall system deve-
lopment.
Another reason for the expected evolution of the risk assessment system in terms 
of the number of open cases and forwarded notifications of suspicious transactions 
(NST27) is that in the period 2009-2010, 642 cases were opened and 235 NSTs sent 
to the competent authorities for further processing pursuant to the received reports 
on suspicious transactions. Or, out of 1,231 suspicious transactions reported by 
reporting entities in the period from 2009 to 2010, the Office opened 642 cases 
(52% of suspicious transactions reported in this period), whereas 235 NSTs 
submitted account for 19% of the total suspicious transaction reports.
24 Regulations on the Notification of the Anti-Money Laundering Office of Suspicious Transactions and Persons 
(Croatian version, OG 1/09).
25 Entities subject to the measures, actions and procedures for the prevention and detection of money laundering 
and terrorist financing are specified in Article 4 of the AMLTFA.
26 The Ministry of Finance Annual Reports for 2009 and 2010; available at: [http://www.mfin.hr/hr/godisnjaci-
ministarstva].
27 Notifications of suspicions of money laundering or terrorist financing in the country or abroad, submitted by 
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1955.1.1.2 slovenia, Romania and Ukraine
Slovenia also saw a decline in reported suspicious transactions in 2009. However, 
worth noting are some typical characteristics of the money laundering (and terro-
rist financing) prevention practice in Slovenia. The Slovenian Anti-Money Laun-
dering and Terrorist Financing Act28 came into force in mid-2007. A comparison 
between the number of suspicious transaction reports in 2005 (116) and 2006, 
when a rule-based approach was used (165), suggests their increase. But as early 
as 2007, after the harmonisation of the national legislation with international stan-
dards and the introduction of a risk assessment system in the middle of the year, 
only a minor increase was observed in reported suspicious transactions (192), 
probably due to the new principle of operation. In 2008, however, their number 
rose to 248, but fell again to 199 in 2009. Another increase in the number of repo-
rted suspicious transactions was seen in 2010 (233). As these were only slight 
changes in the already small number of reported suspicious transactions, and one 
could hardly talk about regularity in the number of suspicious transactions as the 
result of application of the risk assessment system. The only constant was the ac-
tive participation of the financial sector, notably banks, (with 75% to 80%) in the 
total number of reported suspicious transactions in the period 2008-201029. Never-
theless, the fact that the total number of reported suspicious transactions equals 
the number of open cases suggests that there is some degree of awareness among 
Slovenian reporting entities about this matter and that Slovenia’s Office works 
efficiently.
Like most countries, Romania aligned its legislation with international regulatory 
standards as late as 2008, although it had recognised the importance of the preven-
tion of terrorist financing back in 2002. Judging by statistics, a downward trend in 
reported suspicious transactions was observed in the period 2005-2009, with the 
exception of 2010, when an increase was recorded. As the number of suspicious 
transactions went up (to 2,925 in 2010), credit and financial institutions continued 
to account for a large share (90%) in total reported suspicious transactions. In 
2010, however, the number of reported suspicious transactions increased by 29% 
from 2009, as a result of training within a twinning project in cooperation with the 
Polish FIU30 and the application of on-line reporting parameters (Cindori, 2008). 
The increase in the number of suspicious transactions by raising the awareness of 
the financial sector (primarily through training) certainly suggests a positive trend. 
However, giving prominence to on-line reporting as an indicator of an (artificial) 
increase in this number is surely negative.
28 Zakon o preprečevanju pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma (Ur. l. RS 60/07).
29 Poročilo o delu Urada Republike Slovenije za preprečevanje pranja denarja za leto 2010; available at: [http://
www.uppd.gov.si/si/delovna_podrocja/podatki_o_delu_urada/].
30 Main elements related to National Office for Prevention and Control of Money Laundering’s activity, 
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196 Besides Croatia, Slovenia and Romania, Ukraine is also on the list of countries 
showing a downward trend in suspicious transaction reporting. This country is 
special in terms of its system for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist 
financing, as it had no adequate national legislation to this effect until 2003, but 
exclusively followed the relevant international standards, primarily the FATF Re-
commendations. It was therefore put on a “blacklist” of non-cooperative countries 
(Cindori, 2010). Based on a Law on the Prevention of and Counteraction to Lega-
lisation (Laundering) of Illegal Proceeds from Crimes that entered into force in 
2003, the country established a money laundering prevention system and harmo-
nised its legislation with the Third Directive by introducing a Law on the Preven-
tion of and Counteraction to Legalisation (Laundering) of Illegal Proceeds from 
Crimes and Terrorist Financing in 2010.31
Despite the small size of Ukraine, statistical data suggest an enormous number of 
reported suspicious transactions in the country. Despite a fall in these transactions 
from 350,000 in 2005 to 96,221 in 2010, their number is still huge. Even the smal-
lest recorded number of suspicious transactions (96,221) reported in 2010 (the fi-
gure refers to the period before 1 August 2010) is 160 times the number of such 
transactions reported for the same year in, e.g. Croatia (602). According to the 
statistical data given in table 1 and their comparison with the data on reported 
suspicious transactions in Ukraine, the real number of reported suspicious transac-
tions is expected to decline in the future, due to compliance with international 
standards and the implementation of a risk assessment system.
5.1.2 an increase in the number of reported suspicious transactions 
In contrast to the described downward trend in reported suspicious transactions in 
Croatia, Slovenia, Romania and Ukraine, the Final Study supports the view that 
an increase in the number of reported suspicious transaction can be accounted for 
by a comprehensive implementation of the risk assessment system. The following 
statistics for a number of developed Western and North European countries will 
show whether this is really true and to what extent the evaluation of a risk asses-
sment system can be based on the number of reported suspicious transactions.
5.1.2.1 switzerland, france, the netherlands and Germany
Switzerland saw a modest increase in reported suspicious transactions from 2006-
2009, which was even sharper in 2010 (29%). In the Annual Report for 201032 the 
upsurge in reported suspicious transactions was accounted for by the investigation 
of two complex cases in the banking sector which resulted in a large number of 
reports on suspicious transactions (144). Despite this, the banking sector conti-
nued to participate with 71% in the total number of reported suspicious transac-
31 Law of Ukraine on Prevention and Counteraction to Legalization (Laundering) of the Proceeds from Crime 
or Terrorist Financing as of 18 May 2010, No 2258.
32 Annual report by the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland (MROS): a publication of the Fede-
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197tions. An increase in the number of reports on suspicious transactions was also 
observed in the payment services sector, fiduciaries (trustees) and asset managers.
However, a real indicator of a highly developed risk assessment system is the 
number of suspicious transactions reported on the basis of own assessment rather 
than on the basis of strict legal provisions. The former type of reports is typical of 
the financial sector (banks and the payment service sector) and it accounts for one 
sixth of total reported suspicious transactions over the last eight years. The total 
number of reports based on own assessment grew in the reference period (2005-
2010) due to legislative changes allowing the submission of reports directly to the 
MROS (the Swiss FIU) and not thanks to the criminal prosecution authorities.
We can therefore conclude that the Swiss system for prevention of money launde-
ring and terrorist financing raises the awareness of the non-banking and non-finan-
cial sectors, which results in a larger number of suspicious transaction reports 
coming exactly from these sectors. However, an increase in the number of suspi-
cious transactions reported on the basis of own assessment was also noticed.
Furthermore, the above described policy also raises the issue of delivery of infor-
mation on attempted money laundering, i.e. on funds related to criminal organisa-
tions and funds derived from serious crimes, or generated by criminal organisa-
tions. This relates to a situation when a transaction has not yet been executed, or a 
business relationship has not yet been established33. In such cases, it is difficult to 
prove the predicate offence, or initiate criminal proceedings. However, the Swiss 
Federal Law on Combating Money Laundering in the Financial Sector is prima-
rily a preventive piece of legislation the purpose of which is achieved merely by 
preventing money launderers from the execution of actual transactions. Although 
the notifications of unexecuted transactions have not been sent to the MROS, 
money launderers have still failed to place the funds into the financial system, 
which markedly limited their activities. 
France is another good example of the risk-based system implementation. The 
statistical review of reported suspicious transactions for this country in the period 
2005-2010 suggests continued growth in their number. What makes the French 
system unique and highly effective is the decline in banks’ participation in the 
total number of reported suspicious transactions (although this number has grown 
from year to year). In 2010, they participated with less than 75% in the total. A 
marked increase in suspicious transaction reports was observed in authorised 
exchange offices, due to the growing trade in gold and other precious metals, 
which is considered a safe investment in times of economic and financial crises. 
Besides, the increase in this type of transactions may also be due to innovative 
methods and techniques of money laundering aimed at avoiding the sophisticated 
anti-money laundering methods employed by the banking sector.
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198 An increase in the number of reported suspicious transactions has also been obser-
ved in investment firms, financial investment advisers, brokers and portfolio ma-
nagement companies. A clear evidence of effective implementation of the risk 
assessment system in France is provided in the statistics of non-financial institu-
tions, especially notaries public, auctioneers, casinos, auditors and chartered ac-
countants34 that suggest sizeable growth of suspicious transactions. Such a statisti-
cal analysis shows that money launderers have spared no effort in finding new, 
innovative ways of legalization of illicitly acquired funds. On the other hand, the 
French example shows the high awareness and willingness to detect suspicious 
and illogical transactions in all areas of prevention of money laundering and ter-
rorist financing. 
A statistical analysis of the Dutch system of prevention of money laundering and 
terrorist financing also gives positive results. In the Netherlands, suspicious tran-
sactions are statistically presented in the system of prevention of money launde-
ring and terrorist financing at two levels: at the level of cash and the level of non-
cash suspicious transactions. Despite being mentioned in the Final Study as a 
country with a falling number of reported suspicious transactions, this fall only 
relates to cash transfers (which totalled 32,100 and 29,795 in 2009 and 2010 re-
spectively).
On the other hand, an increase in the number of reported suspicious transactions, 
established in the statistical analysis, relates to non-cash transfers (3,453 in 2009 
and 4,408 in 2010). In the category of reported suspicious non-cash transactions, 
the share of banks in the total number of such transactions increased by 28% in 
2010 from 2009. The same is true for suspicious transactions reported by casinos 
and payment card companies (although their relative shares in the total remained 
unchanged). By contrast, reported transactions involving non-cash transfers tren-
ded downwards, particularly in freelance occupations (-14%) and companies pro-
viding money transfer services (-19%). This negative trend does not support the 
implementation of the risk assessment system. Taking also into account the redu-
ced share of banks in the total number of reported suspicious cash transactions, 
one can conclude that money launderers trying to legalize their illicit earnings 
increasingly use new technologies available within the financial sector, i.e. they 
use all forms of fund transfer offered by the modern technology.
A statistical analysis of the data on reported suspicious transactions in Germany 
shows a similar upward trend. In the period 2008-2010, the number of reported 
suspicious transactions increased, not only in the financial sector but also in insu-
rance companies, tax advising companies, casinos and especially persons invo-
lved in trade. Compared with the data on suspicious transactions in table 1, Ger-
many demonstrates a remarkable level of awareness of all institutions involved in 
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199the implementation of the system for prevention of money laundering and terrorist 
financing, especially those in the non-financial sector.
A 22% increase in the number of reported suspicious transactions (in terms of 
statistics), from 9,046 in 2009 to 11,042 in 2010, was rather insignificant, because 
almost 20% of transactions reported in the period 2009-2010 related to transfers 
of illicit funds across bank accounts to third persons and the theft of personal data 
from email accounts35. Viewed from this perspective, the total number of suspi-
cious transaction reports in the period 2007-2010 has not changed significantly. In 
other words, the application of a prevention strategy to combat money laundering 
and terrorist financing remained constant, with a slight increase in 2010.
The reason for such a modest increase lies entirely in the legislation. The tre-
atment of suspicious transactions is regulated in Article 11 of the German36 Act on 
the Detection of Proceeds from Serious Crimes, which provides that, should enti-
ties covered by the Act have grounds to believe that (regardless of the amount of 
a transaction) a crime pursuant to Article 261 of the German Criminal Code (mo-
ney laundering) or terrorist financing has been committed or attempted, they 
should without delay verbally inform the competent authority thereof. In order to 
explain the “borderline of suspicion” in detecting suspicious transactions, the Ger-
man FIU passed an opinion that covered entities must have knowledge, a suspi-
cion or reasonable suspicion that money laundering or terrorist financing will be 
attempted or committed. As a result of the said explanation of Article 11 of the 
German Criminal Code, the number of reported suspicions transactions rose 
slightly in 2010.
However, all this said, and having particularly in mind the relatively small number 
of reported suspicious transactions, account should be taken of the fact that the 
German FIU is organised on the model of a police unit, which has certain conse-
quences. Such FIUs are not suitable for direct contacts with non-financial institu-
tions, as they are focused on investigation rather than on prevention measures. For 
this reason, they are constantly faced with distrust of financial institutions (nota-
bly banks), especially with regard to the categorisation of transactions that are not 
defined by legislation but show inconsistencies in operations. Indeed, such FIUs 
can be disinclined to “participate actively”, as required by financial institutions, 
especially in those banking systems where the banking secret has traditionally 
been regulated (Condemi and Pascal, 2005).
5.1.2.2 serbia, bulgaria and liechtenstein 
Serbia harmonised its legislation with international standards, notably the Third 
Directive, during 2009. Statistics on reported suspicious transactions (4,537) cle-
35 For more information, see: Federal Criminal Police Office, FIU Germany Annual Report 2010; available at: 
[http://www.bka.de/nn_195184/EN/Publications/AnnualReportsAndSituationAssessments/FinancialIntelligen-
ceUnitFiuGermany/financialIntelligenceUnitFiuGermany__node.html?__nnn=true].
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200 arly point to their growth. However, it is interesting to note that the bulk of reports 
come from the financial sector, i.e. banks. Moreover, according to the Annual 
Report37, total number of reported transactions (including cash and suspicious 
transactions) declined from 2009.
As this paper focuses on the value of the definition of suspicious transactions, 
which reflects itself in practice through statistical data, it is interesting to draw a 
comparison between the Croatian and Serbian legislations, as their conceptions 
are very similar, except for the substantial difference in the definitions of suspi-
cious transactions. Despite similarities in the development history of the anti-mo-
ney laundering legislation and harmonisation with international standards, statisti-
cal data show diametrically opposed results in practice.
A comparison between the Croatian and Serbian legislations and the statistical 
data presented in table 1, some conclusions can be drawn with respect to the im-
plementation of the risk assessment system. The two countries’ laws on the pre-
vention of money laundering and terrorist financing do not only bear the same 
name, but they are also similar in content, although in Croatia, most essential is-
sues are regulated by subordinate legislation (regulations). Nevertheless, there are 
differences in the treatment of suspicious transactions. Thus, while the Croatian 
Anti-Money laundering and Terrorist Financing Act provides a very detailed de-
scription of a suspicious transaction, there is no definition of this concept in the 
Serbian law. As concerns the obligation to submit data on suspicious transactions, 
Article 37 of the Serbian Act only generally lays down this obligation. Moreover, 
as a result of alignment with international standards and acting in accordance with 
the provisions of the AMLTFA, Croatia introduced radical changes in the concept 
of and reporting on suspicious transactions as early as next year (2009). During 
the reference period (2005-2010), Serbia saw a continuous increase in suspicious 
transaction reports, suggesting that, despite the new legislation, this country pre-
served its former principles of operation. In other words, the normative accepta-
nce of a risk-based system was not adequately reflected in practice.
Bulgaria also saw an increase in the number of reported suspicious transactions in 
the period 2005-2010, with a surge recorded in 2010. The number of reported 
suspicious transactions rose from 883 in 2009 to 1,460 in 2010 (up 60%), exclusi-
vely due to a large number of reports coming from heads of Securities Registers 
and monetary institutions. In the period 2005-2009, banks accounted for as much 
as 80% of suspicious transaction reports (only 50% in 2010). Monetary institu-
tions participated with 35% in the total number of suspicious transactions in 2010. 
The numbers of reports from other financial and non-financial institutions remai-
ned below average.
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201The last country covered by the statistical analysis of reported suspicious transac-
tions in the period 2005-2010 is Liechtenstein. It appears in table 1 as a negative 
example of the risk-based system application, which is not too surprising, given 
that it was placed on the “blacklist” of non-cooperative countries in 2000. The 
attitudes of some countries to Liechtenstein in this respect have not changed signi-
ficantly since then. Slovenia, for example, pursuant to Article 22 and 38 of its 
Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act, has put this country on a list 
of countries that pose ML/TF risks. Supporting this attitude is also the fact that the 
FIU of Liechtenstein (a country with 34,000 inhabitants and an area of 160 square 
kilometres) received 261 reports on suspicious transactions (the figure relates to 
the period ending 1 October 2010)38. This shows that the increase in the number 
of reported suspicious transactions in this country, regardless of its compliance 
with international standards, is by no means the result of the risk-based system 
implementation. Otherwise, this figure would speak in favour of Slovenia’s 
ranking this country among the high-risk countries with respect to money launde-
ring and terrorist financing. This is confirmed by the fact that the number of cases 
submitted to the competent authorities for further processing is very close to the 
number of reported suspicious transactions, which again equals the number of 
open cases at the FIU of Liechtenstein.
5.2 a brief overview of analysed countries with regard to the 
risk-based system application
As indicated in the Final Study, the upward trend in reported suspicious transac-
tions in some of the observed countries really suggests that effective risk asses-
sment systems are in place. Successful risk categorisation and assessment in 
Switzerland, France and Germany is reflected not only in a higher total number of 
reported suspicious transactions but also in the growing participation of the non-
banking and non-financial sectors in this upward trend. However, the examples of 
Serbia and Bulgaria show that only one indicator, in our case the reports on suspi-
cious transactions, is not enough evidence of the risk-based system implementa-
tion, because the statistical analyses in these countries have revealed an increase 
in reported suspicious transactions exclusively in the banking sector. 
In Croatia, the number of reported suspicious transactions, which is obviously on 
the decline, also points to effective implementation of the risk-based system. This 
conclusion is based on the relevant legislation that provides a very detailed de-
scription of suspicious transactions, and on the active involvement of reporting 
entities in the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing (through the 
formulation of indicators, education and, finally, being subject to penal provi-
sions). The reports on suspicious transactions have thus gained importance and 
quality, as shown by the ratio between reported transactions and cases opened by 
the Office. However, there is still room for improvement.
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202 The analyses of reported suspicious transactions for the Netherlands and Slovenia 
lead to several possible conclusions. Despite irregularities in reporting on suspi-
cious transactions, (variability in the number of reports in the observed period), 
Slovenia shows an effective application of the risk-based system, given a low 
number of reported suspicious transactions that always equals the number of open 
cases at the Slovenian FIU. In the Netherlands, however, cash transactions are 
strictly separated from non-cash transactions, with a strong increase observed in 
suspicious non-cash transactions reported by banks, and a decline in the number 
of suspicious non-cash transactions reported by the non-financial sector. While 
these data do not corroborate the application of a risk-based system, the situation 
they describe can still be justified by new trends in money laundering.
Regardless of the fall in reported suspicious transactions in Ukraine and a rise in 
Liechtenstein, the conclusion of the reported suspicious transaction analysis for 
these two countries is obvious. The excessive total number of reports suggests 
deficiencies in several areas, from legislation through implementation in practice, 
which once again confirms that the number of reported suspicious transactions is 
an inadequate criterion for the efficiency evaluation of a risk assessment system.
To sum up, indicators of an efficient a risk-based system application must be sou-
ght in multiple areas, separately analysing each particular system for prevention 
of money laundering and terrorist financing, from the development of legislation 
to practical measures taken by each individual country.
6 conclusion
Taking into account all efforts to define an effective money laundering prevention 
system based on risk assessment, comprehensive statistical data, as a reflection of 
practice, support the following conclusions: 
 –  An effective risk assessment system requires an appropriate legal framework 
including a detailed definition of suspicious transactions, efficient supervi-
sion and appropriate sanctions in the cases of non-compliance with regula-
tions.
 –  A risk assessment system requires that an increasing portion of suspicious 
transactions be reported by non-financial institutions as evidence of raising 
awareness in this sector.
 –  There is a need for ongoing education of all institutions involved in the im-
plementation of anti-money laundering and terrorist financing measures at 
the national level.
These conclusions have also been supported by the previous statistical analysis of 
ten countries based on the criterion of an increase vs. decrease in the number of 
reported suspicious transactions. The effectiveness of a risk assessment system 
cannot be measured by the number of reported suspicious transactions. While in 
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203an increase provides evidence of an effective risk assessment system being in 
place, in others, like Serbia, Bulgaria and Liechtenstein, it proves quite the oppo-
site, even taking into account the organisational differences among the national 
FIUs. 
Similarly, a fall in reported suspicious transactions in Croatia, Slovenia or Roma-
nia does not mean inadequate application of the risk-based system. On the con-
trary, by harmonising their respective legislations with the international money 
laundering and terrorist financing standards, these countries have proved their 
willingness to reduce the number of reported suspicious transactions, while ensu-
ring high quality of their content. 
The above analysis clearly demonstrates that informed decisions on a customer’s 
behaviour or on an executed transaction can only be made on the basis of com-
prehensive legislation, ongoing education, an up-to-date perception of risks and, 
finally, learning on errors.
It follows that the development of any system, including the risk-based system, 
requires a wide range of information sources and thorough processing of informa-
tion, as well as a long-standing practice, in order to ensure the best possible inter-
pretation of collected information and its categorisation. The application of such a 
system provides a basis for further development of operational policies and proce-
dures, while improving the system in order to successfully respond to new chal-
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